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WRESTLING WITH THE TAR BABY:
ETInCAL OBLIGATIONS OF MISSISSIPPI INSURANCE DEFENSE LAWYERS
Moeller v. American Guarantee& Liability Insurance Co.
No. 92-CA-00829-SCT, 1996 WL 532387 (Miss. Sept. 19, 1996)1
J Kevin Owens
"No man can serve two masters:for either he will hate the one and love
2
the other,or he will be devoted to the one and despise the other"
I.

INTRODUCTION

Within the practice of law, there is no specialty more directly affected by conflict of interest problems than insurance defense.' Routinely, attorneys are
retained by insurance carriers to defend their insureds, and there is no question
that an attorney-client relationship exists between that attorney and the insured.
The confusion is whether that same relationship exists between the insurer and
the counsel it retains.' The source of much of this confusion is the dual client
approach in which defense counsel is deemed to have two clients: the insurer
and the insured.'
This confusion has recently been brought to light in Moeller v. American
Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co.' In a case that will lead many lawyers to
re-examine the relationship between insurers and defense counsel, and one which
may ultimately spell the demise of insurance defense in Mississippi, the
Mississippi Supreme Court adopted a dual client approach while at the same
time placing upon the insurer the contractual obligation of affording the insured
the opportunity to select his own independent counsel to protect his interests at
the expense of the insurer.7
This Note analyzes two aspects of the Moeller holding: the contractual obligations of the insurance carrier, and the ethical obligations of the insurance carrier's
retained attorney. These aspects will be examined in light of existing
Mississippi law, including current Mississippi Rules of Professional Conduct, as
well as trends established by other states and federal jurisdictions.

1.As of the time this Note was written, this opinion had not been released for publication in the permanent
law reports. Until released, it is subject to revision or withdrawal; however, it was decided en banc drawing no
dissenting opinion as to the points that are the focus of this Note.
2. Matthew 6:24.
3. Karon 0. Bowdre, Conflicts of Interest Between Insurer and Insured: Ethical Traps for the
Unsuspecting Defense Counsel, 17 AM. J. TRIAL ADVoC. 101 (1993).
4. For a broader discussion of resolution of this confusion see Michael A. Berch & Rebecca W Berch, Will
the Real Counsel for the Insured Please Rise?, 19 Ariz. St. L.J. 27 (1987); Ronald E. Mallen, Insurance
Counsel: The Fine Line Between ProfessionalResponsibility and Malpractice,45 INs. COUNSEL J. 244 (1978);
Bowdre, supra note 3; Scott L. Machanic, Insurance Defense Counsel: Who Is the Client?, 43 FED'N OF INS. &
CORP.COUNSEL QUARTERLY 45 (1992).
5. Robert E. O'Malley, Ethics Principlesfor the Insurer the Insured, and Defense Counsel: The Eternal
TriangleReformed, 66 TUL. L. RE. 511 (1991).
6. No. 92-CA-00829-SCT, 1996 WL 532387 (Miss. Sept. 19, 1996)(en banc).
7. Id. at *7.
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FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

American Guarantee and Liability Insurance Company [hereinafter American
Guarantee] issued to the professional law corporation of Fuselier, Ott, McKee
and Moeller, PA., a special multi-peril policy.8 This policy provided coverage
and the right and duty of American Guarantee to defend personal injury claims. 9
Armin J. Moeller, a member of Fuselier, Ott, McKee and Moeller,1" filed suit
against that firm alleging that the defendants had "wrongfully discharg[ed] him,
breach[ed] the employment agreement and stock redemption agreement, [made]
fraudulent misrepresentations to get him into and also to breach the agreement,
and damaging his reputation.''1 1
Upon notification of this pending litigation, Fuselier, Ott and McKee requested
that American Guarantee acknowledge coverage and retain Charles Brocato12 to
defend the suit on their behalf. 3 This initial request was denied; however,
Brocato convinced American Guarantee that Moeller's claims were covered
under the multi-peril policy. American Guarantee ultimately agreed to provide a
defense under a reservation of rights,' 4 but it refused to retain Brocato and
instead opted to choose its own counsel.1
American Guarantee thus assumed the responsibility for the entire defense on
behalf of Fuselier, Ott and McKee with the law firm of Heidelberg, Woodliffe
and Franks which was employed and paid by American Guarantee. 6 As the litigation proceeded, Brocato, as counsel for Fuselier, Ott and McKee," and
Heidelberg, Woodliffe and Franks not only jointly defended Moeller's claim but
also pursued a counterclaim against Moeller. 8
8. Id. at *1.
9. Id. at *2. Under the provisions of the multi-peril policy, personal injury was defined as:
the publication or utterance of a libel or slander or of other defamatory or disparaging material, or a
publication or utterance in violation of an individual's right to privacy; except publications or utterances in the course of or related to advertising, broadcasting or telecasting activities conducted by or
on behalf of the name insured.
Id. at *2.
10. Moeller was fired by Louis A. Fuselier, president of the corporation, who notified him that his employment would be terminated effective May 30, 1982. Id. at * 1.
11. Id.
12. When Fuselier, Ott and McKee incorporated, they retained the services of Charles Brocato, a lawyer
specializing in taxation, to handle their corporate affairs. Id. at *3.
13. Id.
14. American Guarantee notified Fuselier, Ott and McKee of their position by letter stating:
It appears there is or may be a question as to the position of the company for reasons of questions of
coverage concerning the various allegations in the suit .... The purpose of this letter is to advise
you that we will, at this time, proceed with the investigation, handling and defense of this case with
a full reservation of our rights.
Id. Of the allegations alleged in Moeller's claim, it appears that only the misrepresentation, fraud, and damages
to professional reputation claims were covered under the language of the policy. Id. All of the remaining allegations were outside the policy coverage. Id.
15. Id. at *4. American Guarantee retained the firm of Heidelberg, Woodliff & Franks to defend the claim.
Id.
16. Id.
17. Brocato continued to represent Fuselier, Ott and McKee as the firm's own attorney, at the firm's
expense. Id.
18. Id. at *3. This counterclaim alleged that Moeller "had began to solicit ... the legal representation of
clients of the association and had attempted to personally injure the reputation and goodwill of the association
as well as [individual] reputations of Fuselier, Ott and McKee." Id.
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Upon hearing this matter, the Special Chancellor found that "there had been a
breach of the employment and stock redemption agreement and .. the defendants had tortiously interfered with Moeller's business relations."19 These facts
served as the basis of the litigation between Moeller and Fuselier, Ott and
McKee. The Chancellor's findings served as the basis of the subsequent litigation between American Guarantee and Moeller along with Fuselier, Ott and
McKee.
Following the order of the Special Chancellor in the litigation between Moeller
and Fuselier, Ott and McKee, American Guarantee filed a declaratory judgment
action against the firm and Moeller"0 "seeking a declaratory judgment ...that it
had properly reserved its rights under the policy, and that it was not responsible
for any portion of the judgment against the firm."'"
In response to this action, Fuselier, Ott and McKee answered and counterclaimed seeking attorney's fees and expenses incurred in defending Moeller's
claim.22 Moeller also filed an answer and a counterclaim. 3 In rendering judgment on this matter, the Special Chancellor held that "as to Moeller's complaint.
. .American Guarantee was obligated to defend.., under the insurance policy,
but was not obligated to indemnify the firm for any acts not covered by the policy."24 Furthermore, the court held that American Guarantee acted properly in
defending under a reservation of rights and thus fulfilled its duties under the policy and was not obligated to pay for the firm's defense.2"
Upon appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that when defending under a
reservation of rights, a conflict of interests exists between the insurer and the
insured and that in such a situation "not only must the insured be given the opportunity to select his own counsel to defend the claim, the carrier must also pay the
legal fees reasonably incurred in the defense."2 The court went on to define the
ethical obligations of attorneys retained by insurance companies to represent the
insured by applying a dual client model which deems the attorney to have two
clients: the insured and the insurer, to each of which he owes a duty.27
19. Id. at * 1. On appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the holding as to breach of the employment and stock purchase agreement but reversed on Moeller's tort claim as to punitive damages, mental
anguish, and attorney's fees. Fuselier, Ott and McKee v. Moeller, 507 So. 2d 63, 70 (Miss. 1987).
20. Although Moeller was named as a defendant in this lawsuit, no relief was sought from him. Moeller v.
American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., No. 92-CA-00829-SCT, 1996 WL 532387, *4 (Miss. Sept. 19, 1996).
21. Id. at *4. American Guarantee also contended that four counts of Moeller's claim were not covered
under the policy, and thus, they were not obligated to defend the parties on appeal of the judgment. Id.
22. Id. at *5. The fees for which Fuselier, Ott and McKee sought reimbursement were fees incurred by
Brocato in regard to his involvement with the defense. Id.
23. Id. In his counterclaim Moeller sought actual damages, punitive damages, and attorney's fees incurred
in the declaratory judgment action as well as costs associated with the defense of the counterclaim filed against
him in the original litigation. Id. American Guarantee was aware that its policy covered Moeller; however, they
did not notify him of this coverage, and it was only after the filing of the declaratory judgment action that
Moeller learned of this coverage. Id. at *4-5.
24. Id. at *6.
25. Id. As to Moeller's counterclaim, the Special Chancellor ruled that American Guarantee did have a duty
to defend Moeller against the counterclaim by Fuselier, Ott and McKee, as it was covered under the policy. Id.
The court further found that Moeller's failure to notify American Guarantee of the counterclaim did not prevent
recovery. Id. As to the punitive damage issue advanced by Moeller, the court denied recovery. Id.
26. Id. at *7.
27. Id.
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BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE LAW

A. CurrentMississippi Rules of ProfessionalConduct
In 1986 the Mississippi Legislature adopted the current version of the
Mississippi Rules of Professional Conduct, which are based primarily on the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct as promulgated by the American Bar
Association. The primary function of these rules is to protect the basic duties
owed by the lawyer to his client: competence, confidentiality, and loyalty.28 In
an effort to combat the ethical problems of conflicts of interest in the "triadic"
relationship between insurer, insured, and attorney, the Mississippi Rules espouse
minimum standards which are designed not to avoid all conflicts, but merely to
diminish their effects. 9
Rule 1.7 squarely addresses conflict problems and provides that in a conflict
situation "a lawyer shall not represent a client" unless he reasonably believes that
the representation can be effectuated without adversely affecting the client and
the client consents after consultation."0 Furthermore, the hiring of an attorney by
the insurer to represent the interests of the insured is sanctioned by Rule 1.8(f),
with appropriate safeguards. 1 Rule 1.8(f) requires that an attorney accepting
compensation from someone other than the client must at all times maintain his
independent professional judgment and that he must protect confidential information. 2
The language of the Mississippi Rules provides no guidance as to whether the
dual or single client approach" is to be followed; however, the prevailing view
among the jurisdictions that have adopted the Model Rules is that "absent a conflict of interest the defense attorney hired by the insurer represents both the
insured and the insurer.' 34 The persuasiveness of this prevailing view, however, is
allayed in light of the interpretive opinions of the Mississippi Bar and the ABA
Commission on Professional Ethics.3"
In Formal Opinion 282 of the ABA Commission on Professional Ethics, the
American Bar Association recognized that "the [insurance] company and the
insured are virtually one in their common interest [the defeat of the third party's
claim] however when the interests diverge the lawyer so employed shall represent
the insured as his client with undivided fidelity."3

28. See Miss. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 cmt. (1996); see also ABA Comm. on Professional

Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 282 (1950)(essential point of ethics involved is that the lawyer so employed
shall represent the insured as his client with undivided fidelity).
29. See Miss. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 & 1.8 (1996).
30. Miss. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7. (1996).

31. Miss. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8(t) (1996).
32. Id.
33. Under the single client approach, defense counsel's allegiance belongs solely to the insured as if he had
retained the lawyer personally. John F. Larkin, Ethical Considerationsfor Attorneys Acting as Insurance
Defense Counsel, PLI Litg. & Admin. Prac. Course Handbook series No. 518 (1995).
34. Bowdre, supra note 3, at 110 (emphasis added).
35. See ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 282 (1950), Formal Interpretive
Opinion No. 211 of the Mississippi Bar (Nov. 18, 1993).
36. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 282 (1950).
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Closer to home, the Mississippi Bar, in Formal Interpretive Opinion number
211, stated that "selected defense counsel owes a client a duty to exercise his or
her independent legal judgment for the benefit of the insured. Defense counsel
may not waive or ignore that obligation as a matter of law or ethics."3 8 Thus, it
appears that the single client approach maintains the weight of authority when
defense counsel faces divergent interests of the insured and the insurer.39
B. State and Federal Case Law on Conflicts in the Triadic Relationship
Primarily, most of the cases dealing with conflicts inherent in the "triadic" relationship originate in state courts because the insurance industry is largely regulated on a state-by-state basis, and attorneys' ethical obligations are defined by local
rules.4" Thus, in order to understand the implications of the Moeller holding as
they relate to the ethical obligations of insurance defense lawyers and the contractual rights and duties of insurance carriers, it is necessary to look at the prevailing
trends in other jurisdictions as compared to pre-existing law in Mississippi.
1.Contractual Rights and Duties of Insurance Carriers
The relationship between the insurer and insured is a contractual relationship
governed by the insurance policy.4' Thus, the obligations and rights of the insurer will be determined pursuant to the terms of that agreement.4 2 Speaking in
contract terms, the insurer's promise to defend as well as indemnify is the consideration received by the insured for the payment of his premiums.43 The insurer's primary obligation is the duty to defend the insured against third party
claims. Generally this duty includes the right "to control the defense and to
select counsel which the insurance company will pay to handle the defense."44
This duty to defend, however, is broader than the insurer's duty to pay a judgment
rendered against its insured.45 Rather, "the duty ...

rests solely on whether the

complaint alleges any facts or grounds which bring the action within the protection purchased."48 Thus, the duty to defend creates an obligation on the part of
'
the insurer "regardless of whether such suit is groundless, false, or fraudulent."47
In order to lessen their exposure under this absolute duty to defend, insurers
will protect their policy defenses by defending under a reservation of rights. In
such a situation the insurer defends the insured while reserving the right to later
deny coverage. By doing so the insurer "may be able to avoid paying the under-

37. Formal Interpretive Opinion No. 211 of the Mississippi Bar (Nov. 18, 1993).
38. Id.

39. Larkin, supra note 33, at 395.
40. Larkin, supra note 33, at 383-84.
41. Larkin, supra note 33, at 385.
42. Federal Ins. Co. v. X-Rite, Inc., 748 E Supp. 1223, 1226 (WD. Mich. 1990) (holding that whether an
insurer has a duty to defend is a function of the insurance contract).
43. Brohawn v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 347 A.2d 842, 850 (Md. 1975).
44. Bowdre, supra note 3, at 102-03.
45. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Louis A. Roser Co., 585 F.2d 932, 936 (8th Cir. 1978).
46. Curtis v. Nutmeg Ins. Co., 612 N.Y.S.2d 256, 258 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (citing Seabord Sur. Co. v.
Gillette Co., 476 N.E.2d 272 (N.Y. 1984)).
47. Larkin, supra note 33 at 385.
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lying claim either by succeeding in its defense of the insured or, failing that, by
successfully asserting its policy defense."48 However, if the insurer chooses to
follow this path, his "desire to control the litigation must give way to its obligation to defend the insured" 49 This obligation obviously entails representation by
an attorney "who can exercise professional judgment and devote complete loyalty to the insured regardless of the circumstances.""0 Thus, in such a situation the
insurer will owe a special duty to the insured. Most jurisdictions take the
approach that when defending under a reservation of rights, the insurer creates
such a conflict of interest that he no longer has the right to control the aspects of
the defense, and as such he should retain independent counsel 1 or in the alternative pay for counsel selected by the insured. 2
Several courts have specifically bestowed upon the insured the right to select
independent counsel at the expense of the insurer when such a conflict arises.5 3
In San Diego Navy Federal Credit Union v. Cumis Insurance Society 4 [hereinafter Cumis], Cumis provided defense counsel for San Diego Navy Federal
Credit Union, pursuant to their contract for insurance, to defend them in an
action filed by a third party.5 5 However, Cumis reserved the right to later deny
coverage as to certain claims contained in the lawsuit.5 6 Upon notification of this
reservation of rights, the credit union retained independent counsel to protect its
interests.57 The trial court required Cumis to pay for the reasonable expenses of
the credit union's retained independent counsel.58
From this judgment Cumis appealed to the California Court of Appeals arguing, pursuant to Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co.," that they had satisfied their duty
to defend by providing counsel and thus were not obligated to pay for independent counsel.6" The court rejected that argument and distinguished Gray on the
basis that "it [did] not address whether the scope of the duty to defend include[d]
payment for the insured's independent counsel where a conflict of interest
exists."6 1 Expanding the scope of the insurer's contractual obligation to defend,
the court stated:
48. CHI of Alaska, Inc., v. Employer's Reinsurance Corp., 844 P.2d 1113, 1115 (Alaska 1993).
49. Federal Ins. Co. v. X-Rite, Inc., 748 F. Supp. 1223, 1227 (WD. Mich. 1990).
50. In re Petition of Youngblood, 895 S.W.2d 322, 328 (Tenn. 1995).
51. The term "independent counsel" is not adequately defined in case law, but the general consensus is that it
is counsel not involved "directly or indirectly with coverage issues." FederalIns. Co., 748 F Supp. at 1228, n. 1.
52. See Brooke Wunnicke, The Eternal Triangle: Standards of Ethical Representation by the Insurance
Defense Lawyer, FOR THE DEFENSE Feb. 1989; see also CHI, 844 P.2d at 1117; FederalIns. Co., 748 E Supp. at
1223.
53. See San Diego Navy Fed. Credit Union v. Cumis Ins. Soc'y, Inc., 208 Cal. Rptr. 494 (Cal. Ct. App.
1985); L&S Roofing Supply Co., v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 521 So. 2d 1298 (Ala. 1987); FederalIns.
Co., 748 F. Supp. at 1223; CHI, 844 P.2d at 1113; see also Todd R. Smythe, Annotation, Duty of Insurer to Pay
For Independent Counsel when Conflict of Interest Exists Between Insured and Insurer, 50 A.L.R. 4th 932
(1986).
54. 208 Cal. Rptr. 494 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
55. Id. at 495.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 497.
58. Id. at 495.
59. 419 P.2d 168 (Cal. 1966).
60. San Diego Navy Fed. Credit Union v. Cumis Ins. Soc'y, Inc., 208 Cal. Rptr. 494, 499 (Cal. Ct. App.
1985).
61. Id. at 501.
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In a conflict of interest situation [here a reservation of rights] the insurer's desire
to exclusively control the defense must yield to its obligation to defend its policyholder. Accordingly, the insurer's obligation to defend extends to paying the
reasonable value of the legal services and costs performed by independent counsel, selected by the insured.62
In so expanding the duty to defend, Cumis impliedly stands for the proposition
that any reservation of rights creates a conflict of interest, thus enabling the
insured to select, at the insurer's expense, independent counsel.6
In the wake of this decision, courts from other jurisdictions began to apply the
Cumis rule but quickly ascertained that it left many critical issues unresolved.
The Supreme Court of Alabama, in L&S Roofing v. St. Paul Fire & Marine
Insurance Co., faced the issue of exactly when a conflict of interest should give
the insured the right to select independent counsel at the expense of the insurer. 4
In this case, the court consented to answer a certified question from the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama as to whether a reservation of rights created such a conflict that the insured was justified in retaining
independent counsel at the expense of the insurer.
St. Paul Insurance Company, as insurer of L&S Roofing, provided defense
counsel to defend an action filed against L&S in state court.66 Subsequent to this
appointment of counsel, St. Paul notified L&S that it was reserving its right to
later disclaim coverage with respect to various allegations in the underlying
action.
Upon receiving this notification, L&S through its individual attorneys
made a demand upon the attorneys retained by St. Paul to allow L&S to retain, at
the expense of St. Paul, independent counsel and to allow this counsel to have
9
control of the defense of the underlying action.' This demand was denied.
After this denial, L&S filed suit against St. Paul seeking declaratory and other
equitable relief.70 In its complaint L&S alleged that St. Paul's lawyers had a clear
conflict of interest in continuing control of the underlying action because they
were retained by St. Paul who had a "direct pecuniary interest" in resolving the
litigation in a manner in which they could later disclaim coverage.7 1
In support of their position, L&S claimed that representation by attorneys
appointed by St. Paul created an "unavoidable conflict of interest" even though
there was no evidence showing any acts constituting an actual or objective conflict on the part of the St. Paul lawyers.72 Thus L&S sought a judicial recognition

62. Id. at 503.
63. Berch & Berch, supra note 4, at 33-34.
64. L&S Roofing Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 521 So. 2d 1298, 1301 (Ala. 1987).
65. Id. at 1298.
66. Id. at 1298-99.
67. Id. at 1300.
68. Id.
69. Id. In denying this demand, attorneys appointed by St. Paul agreed to keep counsel retained by L&S
informed of the progress of the litigation but refused to pay for costs and expenses of that independent attorney
if they decided to take an active role in the litigation. Id.
70. Id. This action was ultimately moved to federal court by petition of St. Paul. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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of a "presumptive conflict of interest."73 St. Paul contended that there existed no
such thing as a "presumptive conflict of interest" and that the lawsuit in question
presented no such "actual conflict of interest" that would give rise to the necessity of independent counsel for L&S Roofing.74
In answering the certified question and adopting the position of St. Paul
Insurance, the court stated that "[t]he mere fact that the insurer chooses to defend
..under a reservation of rights does not ipso facto constitute such a conflict of
interest that the insured is entitled at the outset to engage defense counsel of its
choice at the expense of the insurer."7 5 Instead, before the Cumis rule could be
invoked, the court held that the insured had to establish the presence of an actual
conflict of interest pursuant to the standards delineated by the Washington
Supreme Court in Tank v. State Farm Fire & Casualty.7" Only upon a showing
that these standards were not complied with could an insured avail himself of the
Cumis rule and retain independent counsel at the expense of the insurer.
Another critical question left unresolved by the Cumis decision deals with
what comparative rights the insurer and insured have in the selection of independent counsel once a conflict sufficient to invoke that rule has been established.
This issue was addressed in FederalInsuranceCo. v. X-Rite, Inc.77
In FederalInsurance,X-Rite, Inc. was named as a defendant in a wrongful discharge lawsuit.78 Upon service of the complaint, the firm currently representing
X-Rite as corporate counsel undertook the litigation of the lawsuit.79 After several communications between X-Rite and Federal Insurance, Federal acknowledged its duty to defend under the insurance policy as well as its unwillingness
to pay the fees of the independent counsel retained by X-Rite.8 Instead, Federal
proposed the substitution of counsel retained to defend X-Rite in the underlying
action." These proposals were ignored by X-Rite, who continued the litigation
under a defense provided by its own corporate counsel.82 Eventually a mediation
settlement was reached, and X-Rite demanded that Federal Insurance indemnify
it in the amount of the settlement award as well as reimburse X-Rite in the
amount of attorney's fees owed to its independent counsel.83 Upon receipt of this
demand, Federal filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a judicial declara-

73. Id.
74. Id. at 1301-02.
75. Id at 1304.
76. Id. These standards required:
First, the company must thoroughly investigate the cause of the insured's accident and the nature and
severity of the plaintiff's injuries. Second, it must retain competent defense counsel for the insured.
Both retained defense counsel and the insurer must understand that only the insured is the client.
Third, the company has the responsibility for fully informing the insured not only of the reservationof-rights defense itself, but also of all developments relevant to his policy coverage and the progress
of the lawsuit.
Tank v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 715 P.2d 1133, 1137 (Wash. 1986).
77. 748 E Supp. 1223 (W.D. Mich. 1990).
78. Id. at 1224.
79. Id. at 1225.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
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tion that it was free from liability because "X-Rite breached the insurance contract by refusing to allow Federal to exercise its right and duty to defend."8 4
In responding to this action, the court held that Federal was liable for indemnification in the amount of the settlement award but was not liable for reimbursement of attorney's fees by stating that:
Federal assumed the 'duty' to defend X-Rite, in order to protect X-Rite's interests. Conjunctively, however, Federal reserved the 'right' to defend X-Rite, in
order to protect its own interests. Unless 'right to defend' is to be deemed mere
surplusage, which has not been argued, it must be viewed as conferring upon
Federal some prerogative with respect to the defense beyond simply paying
expenses. This prerogative cannot, in a conflict of interest situation, include an
absolute right to control the litigation. On the other hand, X-Rite's apparent presumption that the conflict of interest, posing a potential of prejudice to its interests, automatically and completely negated all prerogative, is not reasonable.85
In so holding, the court deemed that there was a dichotomy between Federal's
duty and Federal's right to defend.86 The court stated that "right to defend" cannot mean "anything less than participation in selection of counsel, which contractual right ought to be enforced unless contrary to public policy."87 The court
thus adopted a middle ground approach which would require the insurer to
"relinquish control of the litigation, but permits the insurer to select independent
counsel." 8 Therefore the rule adopted by the court provided "adequate safeguards for the interests of both the insured and insurer," otherwise the contractual
right reserved by Federal, namely the "right to defend," would have been totally
abrogated.89
In CHI ofAlaska, Inc. v. Employers Reinsurance Corp.9" [hereinafter CH1], the
Alaska Supreme Court faced both of these critical issues. In this case CHI was
provided a defense under a reservation of rights by its liability insurer,
Employers Reinsurance. 9 CHI objected to this defense by claiming that the
reservation of rights "created a conflict of interest between Employers and CHI,
and demanded independent counsel paid for by Employers and selected by
CHI."92 Employers rejected this contention, and CHI filed an action seeking a
declaration that it was entitled to select independent counsel.93 The trial court
granted summary judgment in favor of Employers on this issue and CHI
appealed. 4
On appeal, the Alaska Supreme Court revisited the issue addressed in L&S
Roofing, and held that defending under a reservation of rights did not automati-

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 1229 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
844 P2d 1113 (Alaska 1993).
Id. at 1114.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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cally present a conflict of interest. 95 The court stated that "[i]f appointed counsel
makes it clear ...that he is going to be involved only in the defense of the liability claim, not in coverage issues, and that his client is the insured ...

conflicts

should be rare."9
As to the comparative rights of the parties in selection of independent counsel,
the court held that the insured has the right to select counsel without interference
from the insurer.97 This holding, however, was not without criticism, and in fact
Justice Moore provided a different rule designed at striking a balance between
the competing interests.98 Under Justice Moore's formulation, the insured would
be allowed the right of final approval of the insured's selection of independent
counsel, but such approval could not be unreasonably withheld. 9
2. Ethical Obligations of Insurance Defense Lawyers
Attorneys retained by insurers to represent their insureds are placed in an ethi100
cal dilemma of having potential, and possibly even actual, conflicts of interest.
This dilemma is augmented by the absence of clear standards with which attorneys can guide their conduct. As such, lawyers may be tempted to follow the
adage warned of by the court in CHI that "[a] lawyer who does not look out for
the carrier's best interest may soon find himself out of work.""1 1
Local ethics rules do provide some guidance in this area, and ideally insurance
defense lawyers should always evaluate their conduct according to these rules of
professional conduct. 10 2 According to Rule 1.3, an attorney is bound to "act with
reasonable diligence and promptness." ' 3 Furthermore, the attorney must also
keep "[his] client reasonably informed about the status of [the lawsuit]"'0 4 as well
as protecting confidential information "relating to representation of a client."10 5
Aside from these ethical standards, many courts have also adopted common
law guidelines to deal with the pervasiveness of the ethical dilemma faced by
insurance defense lawyers. In Tank v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., the

Supreme Court of Washington consolidated two cases on appeal to determine
whether an insurance company defending under a reservation of rights had an
enhanced obligation of fairness toward its insured.10 6 Answering this question in
the affirmative, the court established a distinct criteria which must be met by
defense counsel retained by the insurer to represent that company's insured." 7

95. Id.at1116.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1120.
98. Id. at 1122.
99. Id. (Moore, J., dissenting).
100. In re Petition of Youngblood,895 S.W.2d 322, 327 (Tenn. 1995).
101. CHI of Alaska, Inc. v. Employers Reinsurance Corp., 844 P.2d 1113, 1117 (Alaska 1993).
102. Berch & Berch, supra note 4, at 40.
103. Miss. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.3 (1996).
104. Miss. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.4 (1996).
105. Miss. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCT Rule 1.6 (1996).
106. Tank v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 715 P.2d 1133, 1135 (Wash. 1986).
107. Id. at 1137-38.
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Under this criteria, defense counsel, pursuant to Model Rule 5.4(c),"' was
required to exercise complete loyalty to their client and not allow "the employer
1 9 Secondly,
[insurance company] to influence his or her professional judgment.""
defense counsel must always fulfill a duty of "full and ongoing disclosure to the
insured," which requires disclosure of a "realistic and periodic assessment of the
insured's chances to win ... [and] all offers of settlement must be disclosed to

the insured as those offers are presented.""' If these distinct criteria are satisfied, the court held that the attorney would have discharged his enhanced duty of
good faith under the reservation of rights."'
In addressing the presence of these duties, as well as to whom these duties are
actually owed, a lawyer must first determine the identity of his client. As one
commentator has stated:
Even the most optimistic view of human nature requires us to realize that an
attorney employed by an insurance company will slant his efforts, perhaps
unconsciously, in the interests of his real client-the one who is paying his1 2fee
and from whom he hopes to receive future business-the insurance company.
As such, most of the legal guidelines that have developed in the realm of insurance defense are based on the principle "that defense counsel generally cannot
loyally and completely represent the insured in any situation when there is a conflict or potential conflict between the interests of the insured and the insurer.""'
With this principle in mind, the law has developed the general rule, that absent
a conflict of interest both the insured and insurer are clients because they are
"virtually one in their common interest, that being the defeat of the third party's
claim against the insured."" 4 This rule proves satisfactory in most situations;
however, when divergent interests arise in the triadic relationship the deficiencies
1
of this rule become apparent.

15

When these divergent interests do arise, the law has created two diametrically
opposed views as to the identity of the actual client. Under the "single-client"
approach, when a conflict arises, the insured is entitled to the attorney's undivided loyalty as if that attorney had been retained independently by the insured; that
is to say the insured is the only client.11 At the other end of the spectrum is the
"dual-client" approach. This approach is geared primarily towards the "commu-

108. Model Rule 5.4 (c) provides that " [a] lawyer shall not permit a person who recommends, employs, or
pays the lawyer to render legal services for another to direct or regulate the lawyer's professional judgment in
rendering such legal services." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.4(c) (1996).
109. Tank, 715 P.2d at 1137.
110. Id. at 1137-38.
Ill. Id.
112. O'Malley, supra note 5, at 515.
113. O'Malley, supra note 5, at 514.
114. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 282 (1950).
115. There are various conflicts that can arise in this area. Namely, the insurer may only go through the
motions of providing a defense. Also, the insured might conduct the defense in a way that would make plaintiff's likelihood of success greater under the uninsured theory of liability. The insured may also learn of confidential information which it may later use against the insured to deny coverage. See CHI of Alaska, Inc. v.
Employers Reinsurance Corp., 844 P.2d 1113, 1115 (Alaska 1993).
116. Larkin, supra note 33, at 388.
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nity of interest" existing between the insured and insurer, and under this view the
attorney is bound by applicable ethics rules to "protect the interests of both the
'
insurer and insured."117
As a natural implication of this rule, the insurer will
maintain all the rights of a normal client in that he will have the right to demand
loyalty, communication, and diligence from the retained attorney.118
As discussed previously, the necessity of implementing one of these approaches will not be triggered until an actual conflict of interest has been uncovered.
Thus, the critical determination becomes the existence of a conflict.
Determining the existence of conflicts in the "triad" is as tricky as the nature of
the relationship itself. In Mitchum v. Hudgens, the Supreme Court of Alabama,
in an attempt to promulgate a standard for analyzing conflicts, stated that
"whether a lawyer can fairly and adequately protect the interests of multiple
'
clients.., depends upon an analysis of each case."119
As such, there are no clear
guidelines within this area; however, individual jurisdictions have made an
attempt at establishing standards.
In Spindle v. Chubb/PacificIndemnity Group,2 ' the California Supreme Court
espoused a rule for conflict analyzation that is typical of most jurisdictions. The
court stated that a "conflict of interest between jointly represented clients occurs
whenever the common lawyer's representation of the one is rendered less effective by reason of his representation of the other."12' Thus, in the words of one
commentator, "the attorney should ask: Will my competent representation of one
122
client on this issue be unfavorable to the other client?"'
These questions, however, will not always provide a clear indication of the
existence of a conflict of interest; thus, many practitioners are advised to look for
"conflict clues." These clues, which include reservation of rights and claims in
excess of policy limits, should signal an attorney that a possible conflict exists
such as to trigger the need for client identification. 23 Aside from these prevailing standards, the law of conflict analyzation is unaffected by custom and good
intentions of the retained attorney. In Employers Casualty v. Tilley, the Supreme
Court of Texas warned that "custom, reputation, and honesty of intention and
motive are not the tests for determining the guidelines which an attorney must
follow when confronted with a conflict.' ' 24 Therefore, a retained insurance
defense lawyer cannot hide behind the cloak of good intentions in an effort to
escape conflicts of interest.
By applying these standards of conflict analyzation, attorneys should be able to
uncover most conflicts of interest, and upon this discovery the usually harmo-

117. Larkin, supra note 33, at 387.
118. Larkin, supra note 33, at 387.
119. Mitchum v. Hudgens, 533 So. 2d 194, 200 (Ala. 1988).
120. 152 Cal. Rptr. 776 (Cal. 1979).
121. Id.
122. Bowdre, supra note 3, at 108-09.
123. Charles Silver & Kent Syverud, The Professional Responsibilities of Insurance Defense Lawyers, 45
DUKE L.J. 255 (1995).
124. Employers Cas. v. Tilley 496 S.W2d 552, 558 (Tex. 1973).
125. O'Malley, supranote 5, at 515.

1997]

WRESTLING WITH THE TAR BABY

nious dual client approach is disrupted.125 At this point it becomes necessary to
identify the actual client in order to adequately protect the interests of both the
insured and the insurer. To assist in this determination, the law has provided the
two competing views previously presented, each with its own distinct advantages
and disadvantages.
The prevailing trend throughout the American judicial system is the single
client approach under which "the insurance defense lawyer's ethical duty of undivided loyalty to the client is owed to the insured."'26 Thus, upon the discovery of
a conflict, the insured becomes the sole client.
In an attempt to define the contours of the single client approach, the Arizona
Supreme Court, in Parsons v. Continental National American Group, espoused
the rule that a lawyer owes undivided fidelity to the insured, even though retained
by the insurer.127 In Parsons, the court was required to make a determination as
to whether an insurer could be estopped from denying coverage in a subsequent
garnishment action when its defense was based upon confidential information
received by the carrier's attorney from the insured during the course of representation in the underlying tort action.128 The insured argued that the insurer should
not be allowed to deny coverage based on information obtained by the attorney,
because by doing so the company would be "[taking] advantage of the fiduciary
relationship between its agent [the attorney] and [the insured].' 29
In agreeing with the insured, the court rendered one of the landmark rulings in
the area of insurance defense by stating that "an attorney that represent[s] the
insured at the request of the insurer owes undivided fidelity to the insured, and
to
therefore, may not reveal any information or conclusions derived therefrom
130
action.
subsequent
any
in
insured
the
to
the insurer that may be detrimental
In CarrierExpress, Inc. v. Home Indemnity Co.,13 the District Court for the
Northern District of Alabama confronted a textbook example of a conflict of
interest in the "triadic relationship" dealing with an insurer's bad faith refusal to
settle within the policy limits. In defining the nature of the association between
the insured, insurer, and retained attorney, the court adopted the single client
approach stating that "[b]oth the retained defense counsel and the insurer must
understand that only the insured is the client ...[and that] an insurance company
conmust refrain from engaging in any action which would demonstrate a greater
1 32
cern for the insurer's monetary interest than for the insured's financial risk.'
In further support of the single client approach, the American Bar Association,
in Ethics Opinion 282,laa has stated that the "essential point of ethics involved is
that the lawyer so employed shall represent the insured as his client with undivided fidelity." 134 As such, it appears that the single client has a great weight of
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authority behind it when a retained attorney faces divergent interests of insured
and insurer.
In spite of the authority supporting the single client approach, many jurisdictions have adopted the increasingly popular rule that "insurance defense counsel
is deemed to have two clients in any given case: the insurer and the insured."'35
In Lieberman v. Employers Insurance, as a result of a settlement of a medical
malpractice claim which was against the defendant physician's wishes, the physician filed suit against the insurer for breach of contract and against the retained
attorney for breach of fiduciary duty arising from the attorney-client relationship. 3 ' In addressing this claim, the court adopted the dual client approach by
holding that a retained attorney "owes to both a duty of good faith and due diligence in the discharge of his duties, the rights of one cannot be subordinated to
those of the other."' 37 Thus, the court attempted to strike a balance between the
competing interests by establishing a rule that placed equal weight upon both
interests such that if counsel believed that it could not discharge its duties to the
insured without conflicting with discharge of its duties to the insurer, then counsel should not represent both.' 38 As such, the rule favored neither interest but
instead bestowed upon each the interests of co-clients.
With the recognition of the existence of an attorney-client relationship between
the insurance company and the retained attorney with regard to disqualification,
New Jersey has adopted the principles of the dual client approach. In Gray v.
Commercial Union Insurance Co., the insurance company moved to disqualify
an attorney and his firm from representing a plaintiff in a suit against the insurance company for breach of an employment contract.' 3 9 The basis for their
removal was the fact that the attorney had been retained numerous times to represent their insureds in personal injury litigation. 4 Thus, the insurance company
claimed that the lawyer was barred by Model Rule DR 4-101 from bringing a
suit against a former client.' 4' The superior court denied Commercial Union's
motion for disqualification, and they timely appealed.' 42
On appeal, the appellate division, reversing the denial and disqualifying the
attorney, held that an attorney-client relationship did exist and that all other
requirements to establish disqualification had been met. 143 The primary reason
for this disqualification was the existence of the attorney-client relationship
based upon the dual client approach in which the court recognized that "there is
no dispute that as a fundamental proposition a defense lawyer is counsel to both
the insurer and insured."' 44 Thus, the lawyer was deemed to have represented the
company in the personal injury litigation even though his primary function was
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
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to protect the interests of the insured in the underlying action.
In dealing with an action by an insured against his insurance company's retained
attorney for settling a dispute without his permission, the Supreme Court of
Alabama applied dual client principles.14 In Mitchum v. Hudgens, the attorney
was retained by a liability insurance carrier to represent Mitchum in a medical
malpractice claim. 46 This lawsuit was eventually settled prior to trial without permission from the defendant physician, who subsequently filed an action against
the attorney claiming fraud and negligence in that representation. 47
At the trial court level, Mitchum's Motion for Summary Judgment was denied,
and in affirming this denial the Supreme Court of Alabama held that "when an
insurance company retains an attorney to defend an action against an insured, the
attorney represents the insured as well as the insurance company in furthering
the interests of each."' 48
A previously unaddressed issue in the "triadic relationship" deals with the
problematic implications that will arise if a malpractice claim is contemplated.
If the single client approach is followed, the non-client insurer will be left with
no recourse since the existence of a legal malpractice claim is based on an attorney-client relationship. In the absence of such a relationship, there is no basis
1 49
for a malpractice claim.
In Atlanta InternationalInsurance Co. v. Bell, the Michigan Court of Appeals
was faced with just such an issue. In this case the plaintiff insurance company
filed a legal malpractice claim against their retained attorney regarding his
defense in an action brought against one of Atlanta International's insureds.'
The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the attorney on the basis
of an absence of an attorney-client relationship between the insurer and the
retained attorney, and Atlanta International appealed.'
On appeal the court of
appeals affirmed the summary disposition and agreed with the circuit court that
there was no attorney-client relationship and thus no basis for a legal malpractice
claim.5 2 In so holding, the court of appeals stated that "[n]o attorney-client relationship exists between an insurance company and the attorney representing the
insurance company's insured ... and the fact that the insurance company pays
the bill will not affect that relationship and duty is owed only to the insured."'5 3
This left the insurer with no recourse even though his financial interest is clearly
at stake.
Recognizing the troublesome nature of the court of appeals holding, the
Supreme Court of Michigan ultimately modified the holding of Bell to allow the
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insurer to maintain a malpractice action under the theory of equitable subrogation.15 4 In so doing, the court gave judicial recognition to the fact the "relationship between the insurer and the retained defense counsel, while less than an
attorney-client relationship, unquestionably differs from the relationship between
a defense counsel and a party-opponent." ' Accordingly, the court held that due
to the merging of interests of the insured and insurer in dealing with a malpractice claim against a retained attorney, the doctrine of equitable subrogation would
permit a malpractice action under the facts presented. 5
Since the insurer's financial interest is so clearly at stake, it seems illogical to
leave it with no remedy in cases of malpractice.15 7 As such, the dual client
approach attempts to protect the interest of the insurer by bestowing upon him
the classification of a co-client. This balancing of interests is typified in
Unigard Insurance v. O'Flaherty & Belgum.'5 8 Here, an insurer filed a legal
malpractice claim against its retained attorney which was summarily dismissed
by the California Superior Court.15 9 On appeal, Unigard argued that an attorneyclient relationship did exist, and thus they had standing to bring a legal malprac1 60
tice claim.
In agreeing with Unigard and reversing the superior court's dismissal, the court
of appeals held that "the retained attorney owes a duty of care to the insurer which
will support its individual right to bring a legal malpractice action against the
attorney for negligent acts committed in the representation of the insured." 6 ' To
hold otherwise, the court held, "would place the loss for the attorney's misconduct
on the insurer. The only winner produced by an analysis precluding liability
would be the malpracticing attorney." '62 Thus, the malpractice implications of the
"triadic relationship" are as problematic as the nature of the relationship itself.
C. Mississippi Case Law on Conflicts in the Triadic Relationship
Prior to the Moeller holding, there was scant case law in Mississippi with
which to guide insurance defense lawyers through the intricacies of the "triadic
relationship;" however, existing case law did provide a basic framework.
1. Contractual Rights and Duties of Insurance Carriers
Following the principles established by other jurisdictions, Mississippi follows
the rule that "the primary consideration in evaluating an insurer's duty to defend
is whether the pleadings allege a claim within the scope of coverage of the insurance policy." '63 Thus, as with other jurisdictions, the basis of the duty is depen-
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dent upon the allegations of the complaint and not the ultimate liability of the
insurer.
Employer's Reinsurance Corp. v. Martin, Gordon & Jones, Inc.164 lays out with
specificity the insurer's contractual obligations in an insurance defense situation.
As to the insurer's ultimate duty to defend, the court applied the general rule that
the duty is determined according to the allegations pled in the third party's complaint.16 Aside from this determination, the court also approved of the insurer's
66
right to proceed under a reservation of rights when coverage issues arose.'
Aside from these rights and duties, there were no other obligations imposed
upon insurers, and prior to Moeller there was no right to independent counsel on
to
behalf of the insured in cases of conflicts. Instead, the insured's only right was
167
rights."
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2. Ethical Obligations of Retained Attorneys
Prevailing Mississippi law stands for the proposition that "[t]here is no higher
ethical duty in the legal profession than complete, absolute fidelity to the interest
of the client... [and thus] an attorney obviously should not attempt to represent
a party when he is obligated to represent an adverse interest, and a conflict of
interest appears."" Prior to the Moeller holding, Mississippi insurance defense
lawyers sought guidance from the Mississippi Supreme Court's holding in
HartfordAccident & Indemnity Co. v. Foster.1 69 In Hartford the court dealt with
an action brought by an insured against their insurer for bad faith refusal to settle
granted
within the policy limits and breach of fiduciary duty.1 70 The circuit court
1 71
appealed.
Hartford
and
insured,
the
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a summary disposition
In addressing this case, the supreme court was faced with defining the nature
of the duties owed by retained counsel in the insurance defense practice. In
answering this question, the court held "[Mississippi] jurisprudence accords with
the majority view that the insurer is the champion of the insured's interests [and
'
In so
that] the interests of the insured are paramount to those of the insurer."172
holding, the court adopted the single client approach in that "there can be no
is
question but that the lawyer owes his client [the insured] absolute loyalty, and
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In seeking reimbursement from American Guarantee, Fuselier, Ott and McKee
filed an action in chancery court seeking a judicial declaration as to the nature of
American Guarantee's duties under the liability policy. 174 Primarily, they wanted
the court to award the attorney fees associated with payment of the independent
counsel retained by them to assist in the defense of Moeller's claim. 17' The
Mississippi Supreme Court recognized early that an ultimate determination of this
issue focused not solely on the language of the policy but also included a problematic examination and determination of the relative contractual and ethical obligations of American Guarantee and its retained attorney. 7 In an effort to resolve this
dispute, as well as to shed some light on the ethical dilemmas of insurance defense
lawyers, the court promulgated standard guidelines to assist Mississippi insurance
' 177
defense lawyers as they navigate the "triadic relationship."
Initially, the court recognized American Guarantee's contractual obligation to
provide a legal defense against Moeller's claim, as it was clearly covered under
the provisions of the policy. 178 As such, the court applied the general rule that the
79
insurer's duty to defend is contingent upon the allegations in the complaint.
Aside from this duty to defend, the court also recognized that American
Guarantee had relative rights under the contract for insurance, specifically the
right to select the attorney to defend the claim. 8 The basis for the recognition
of this right was the fact that American Guarantee would be ultimately liable for
any judgment rendered in the action. 18 As such, the court provided that
American Guarantee's contractual obligations included the duty to provide a
legal defense for claims covered under the policy as well as a duty to pay all
amounts that their insureds became obligated to pay.182
The court recognized that where insurers assert policy or coverage defenses
and provide a defense under a reservation of rights, various conflicts of interest
arise, 183 such that an insurer should be charged with an enhanced obligation
under the policy.1 84 To deal with this problem, the court followed the rule applied
in other jurisdictions that "when defending under a reservation of rights ... a
special obligation is placed upon the insurance carrier ...[in that] not only must
the insured be given the opportunity to select his own counsel to defend the
claim, the carrier must also pay the legal fees reasonably incurred in the
defense.1 8 Thus, the Mississippi Supreme Court relied on the holdings of other
jurisdictions to apply the Cumis rule, which was previously non-existent in
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Mississippi jurisprudence, such that now Mississippi law provided that when
defending under a reservation of rights, the insurer has an enhanced duty under
which he must provide, at his expense, independent counsel.186
In addition to expanding the insurer's contractual duties under the liability policy, the court went on to define the guidelines governing the conduct of the attorney retained by the insurance carrier. 11 7 The Mississippi Supreme Court, in
Moeller, explicitly adopted the dual client approach by holding that the retained
attorney has a professional and ethical obligation to represent both the insurance
company and the insured, thus having two separate and distinct clients.1" Under
this approach, the court recognized the potential for conflict and accordingly
charged the retained attorney with ascertaining, at the time he is offered the case
by the carrier, if there is any possibility of conflicting interests. 89 If there is such
a possibility, the court held that the attorney should only accept representation of
the insurer for the portions of the claim covered by the policy, and in accordance
with the previously announced adoption of Cumis, the insurer should provide the
insured with the opportunity to select independent counsel to protect his
interests.19 °
In applying these guidelines to effectuate a resolution of the claims advanced
by Fuselier, Ott and McKee, the court held that it was the professional obligation
of American Guarantee's retained attorney to recognize the existence of two conflicts of interest, namely the fact that the defense was provided under a reservation of rights and that as defense counsel he was attempting to represent both
parties in defending all claims when only one was covered by the policy.191 With
the presence of these conflicts, the court held that American Guarantee became
obligated to allow the insureds to select independent counsel to ensure protection
of their individual interests.1 92 Accordingly, the Mississippi Supreme Court held
Fuselier, Ott and McKee for
that American Guarantee was obligated to reimburse
193
fees incurred in their defense of the complaint.
V.ANALYSIS
Mississippi's adoption of the dual client approach places it, along with other
jurisdictions, in a position of following a policy that is "unsound as a matter of
'
In order to understand the disadvantages as well
policy, law, and legal ethics."194
as the legal implications created by the court's decision in Moeller, it is necessary to examine each one independently.

188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

Id.
Id. at *10.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
O'Malley, supra note 5, at 512.
Moeller v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., No. 92-CA-00829-SCT, 1996 WL 532387 at *9 (Miss.

MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 17:359

A. Duty of Insurance Carrier
The rules promulgated by the court, as they relate to the contractual obligations
of the insurance carrier, are not surprising, and in fact are in accordance with the
majority trends of other jurisdictions. The problems arise due to the manner in
which the court seeks to implement these rules.
Prior to Moeller there was no provision for Cumis counsel within Mississippi
jurisprudence;195 thus, Moeller establishes the guidelines by which this new rule
should be applied. In providing these guidelines, the Mississippi Supreme Court
espoused a general rule that when defending under a reservation of rights, the
carrier is obligated to allow the insured to select independent counsel.19 As was
recognized by the Alabama Supreme Court, this rule goes too far by simply
requiring a reservation of rights defense before independent counsel is required.
Instead, the more reasoned approach would be to allow the reservation of rights
to function as a conflict clue to signal a possible conflict of interest but requiring
an actual conflict before invoking the duty to provide independent counsel. 97
In the absence of adopting such a reasoned approach, the Mississippi Supreme
Court has treated the insurer with "disdainful indifference reserved for a client's
adversary" by completely abrogating its contractual rights under the policy. 9 '
The Moeller court clearly recognized the insurer's financial stake in the litigation
and their corresponding right to select defense counsel to protect that interest.199
The rule adopted by the court, however, ignores that right by bestowing upon the
insured the ultimate right to select independent counsel in situations of conflict
without any input from the insurer. This rule thus ignores the contractual rights
and financial interests of the insurer.
Notwithstanding this shortcoming of the Moeller holding it does have one
redeeming quality. That is by adopting the dual client approach it creates an attorney-client relationship between the insurer and retained attorney such as to provide
standing for an independent claim of legal malpractice on behalf of the insurer.
B. Duties of Insurance Carrier'sAttorney
The decision in Moeller, as it applies to the ethical obligations of insurance
defense lawyers, is clearly in direct conflict with earlier Mississippi law. Prior to
Moeller, Hartford was the prevailing rule regarding the "triadic relationship,"
and it provided that "the company was not the client. The insured was the
client."20° Therefore, Hartford applied the single client approach in that the
2
Aside from
"interests of the insured are paramount to those of the insurer.""
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Hartford,the ethical opinions of the Mississippi Bar also clearly adopted the single client approach by holding that "selected defense counsel owes a client a duty
to exercise his or her independent legal judgment for the benefit of the insured.
Defense counsel may not waive or ignore that obligation as a matter of law or
ethics."2 2
Aside from this direct conflict with existing law, the dual client approach as
adopted by Mississippi, will also prove to be problematic in its implementation.
The Mississippi Supreme Court, prior to Moeller, in Hartford, recognized that
the "triadic relationship" was a difficult situation, stating that "[i]n sum, the ethical dilemma thus imposed upon the carrier employed defense attorney would tax
Socrates, and no decision or authority

. . .

furnishes a completely satisfactory

answer. ' '203 However, the rule announced in Moeller will do nothing to clear up
the confusion in this area but will instead create a great many more problems
than it actually resolves.

0 4

The first problem in the implementation of this holding relates to problems
associated with identifying conflicts. The Moeller holding provides that "counsel must be careful at the time he is asked to represent the insurance carrier and
the insured, and if there is any reason indicating a possible conflict of interest...
he should under no circumstances undertake to represent them both."20 The
problems arise in attempting to answer the question: how inevitable must the
possibility of a conflict be before it will preclude representation? The Moeller
rule provides no guidance in this area. Thus attorneys may be reluctant to accept
representation of this nature because of the uncertainty that a conflict will later
arise which will preclude representation since the insured will be allowed to
select independent counsel.
In a somewhat ironic fashion, the Moeller holding also creates an increase in
the cost of insurance defense because in any reservation of rights defense the
insurer will have to provide two attorneys: one to protect the interest of the insurer for the claims covered under the policy, and one for the insured to protect its
interests. The Moeller holding specifically provides that if a possible conflict is
present an attorney "should undertake to represent only the interest of the insurance carrier for the part covered, and the insurance carrier should afford the
insured ample opportunity to select his own independent counsel to look after his
interest."2 6 This gives rise to the possibility of the necessity of two lawyers from
the start of every defense. This cost could eventually become so high that insurance companies will no longer be able to provide legal defenses under their policies and thus severely curtail the Mississippi insurance defense practice.

203. HartfordAccident & Indem. Co., 528 So. 2d at 273.
204. For a detailed list of problems that arise in employing the dual client approach, see O'Malley, supra note
5, at 515.
205. Moeller v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., No. 92-CA-00829-SCT, 1996 WL 532387, *7 (Miss. Sept.
19, 1996).
206. Id. at *8.
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VI. CONCLUSION

As one commentator has stated, "being caught in the middle between the
insured and the insurer when a conflict of interest exists is much like wrestling
with the proverbial tar baby. Every effort to extract a limb results in entanglement of another. Loyalty to one client contravenes the ethical obligations owed
to the other."2" 7 The Mississippi Supreme Court, in an effort to combat the problems of the "triadic relationship" and provide a set of standards to govern attorney conduct, has jumped headlong into this battle with the tar baby. Their decision, although it solves many problems, creates a great many more that will now
plague the courts as practitioners attempt to implement this holding. There is no
doubt that Mississippi needs a predictable way to ensure loyalty to insureds;
however, the dual client approach as promulgated in Moeller is not a satisfactory
solution.
207. Bowdre, supra note 3 at 149.

